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Landlord and Tenant-ABOLITION OF BASIC PREMISE OF LANDLORD
TORT IMMUNITY-LANDLORD'S DUTY TO TENANT GOVERNED SOLELY
BY NEGLIGENCE PRINCIPLES

Sargent v. Ross, 308 A.2d 528 (N.H. 1973)
At common law the lease of land was treated as equivalent to a
sale of the land for the term of the lease. The lessee acquired an
estate in land and was, for the time he occupied the land, subject to
virtually all the liabilities of the owner of a fee simple.' For this
reason, the doctrine of caveat emptor applied to a lessee as well as
to a vendee: the tenant, like a vendee, was required to inspect the
land for himself and take it as he found it. The general rule was
that there was no tort liability on the part of the landlord to the
tenant or to others entering on the land for injuries resulting from
2
conditions on the premises.
Changing social conditions, however, including the shift from
an- agrarian to an urban-suburban society,3 gradually caused the
law to recognize a number of exceptions to the general rule of
landlord nonliability. The landlord has been held liable in tort to a
party injured on the leased premises where the party has been able
to show that: (1) the landlord concealed from the tenant a danger4
ous condition in existence at the time the lease was entered into;
1 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 356, comment a (1965).
2 W. PROSSER, TORTS § 63 (4th ed. 1971); 1 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 104 (3d ed.
B. Jones 1939). For discussions of the historical development of the common law rules as to
landlord and tenant, see Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 1279 (1960);
Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant:A Critical Evaluation of the Past with Guidelines
for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 225 (1969).
3 In Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970), Judge Skelly Wright emphasized the changing patterns of American life as
a basis for re-evaluation of the landlord-tenant relationship:
The assumption of landlord-tenant law, derived from feudal property law, that
a lease primarily conveyed to the tenant an interest in land may have been
reasonable in a rural, agrarian society; it may continue to be reasonable in some
leases involving farming or commercial land. In these cases, the value of the lease to
the tenant is the land itself. But in the case of the modern apartment dweller, the
value of the lease is that it gives him a place to live ....
When American city
dwellers, both rich and poor, seek "shelter" today, they seek a well known package
of goods and services-a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but
also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities, secure
windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.
4 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 27.16 (1956); 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 234[2]
(rev. ed. P. Rohan 1971); W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 63; 2 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1,
§ 358. See generally Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 MICH. L REV. 260, 383,
531 (1928); 35 IND. L.J. 361 (1960).
Typical cases involving the concealed defect exception are: Anderson v. Shuman, 257
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(2) the premises were leased for the admission of the public; 5 (3)
the injury occurred on a part of the premises retained in the
lessor's control or provided for the common use of the tenants; 6 (4)
the lessor violated a covenant to repair;7 (5) a statute imposed on
the lessor a duty to repair;8 (6) the lessor negligently repaired the
premises; 9 (7) the lessor rented premises having conditions dangerous to those outside the premises;' 0 (8) the lease was for a short
term." However, despite the decreased harshness of the law proCal. App. 2d 272, 64 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1967); Smith v. Green, 358 Mass. 76, 260 N.E.2d 656
(1970); Johnson v. O'Brien, 258 Minn. 502, 105 N.W.2d 244, 88 A.LR.2d 577 (1960);
Marston v. Andler, 80 N.H. 564, 122 A. 329 (1923).
5 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 4, § 27.16; W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 63; 2
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 359. Cases involving the public use exception include: Spain v.
Kelland, 93 Ariz. 172, 379 P.2d 149 (1963) (tavern); Hayes v. Richfield Oil Corp., 38 Cal. 2d
375, 240 P.2d 580 (1952) (greasepit of service station); Junkerman v. Tilyou Realty Co., 213
N.Y. 404, 108 N.E. 190 (1915) (amusement park).
6 2 R. POWELL, supra note 4,
234[2]; W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 63; 2 RESTATEMENT,
supra note 1, §§ 360, 361. Cases dealing with the control or common use exception are: Kline
v. 1500 Massachusetts Ave. Apts. Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (common hallway);
Gibson v. Hoppman, 108 Conn. 401, 143 A. 635 (1928) (common stairway); Sanford v.
Belemyessi, 284 N.E.2d 588 (Mass. 1972) (rear porch of duplex); Wiggin v. Kent McCray of
Dover, Inc., 109 N.H. 342, 252 A.2d 418 (1969) (automatic door of store); Dubreuil v.
Dubreuil, 107 N.H. 519, 229 A.2d 338 (1967) (common driveway); Black v. Fiandaca, 98
N.H. 33, 93 A.2d 663 (1953) (attic); Flanders v. New Hampshire Say. Bank, 90 N.H. 285, 7
A.2d 233 (1939) (back porch of duplex); Hunkins v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 86 N.H. 356, 169
A. 3 (1933) (roof); Gobrecht v. Beckwith, 82 N.H. 415, 135 A. 20 (1926) (common
bathroom); Coleman v. Steinberg, 54 N.J. 58, 253 A.2d 167 (1969) (heating pipes); Bowman
v. Goldsmith Bros., 63 Ohio L. Abs. 428, 109 N.E.2d 556, appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 121,
107 N.E.2d 114 (1952) (stairway).
7 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 4, § 27.16; 2 R. POWELL; supra note 4, 234[2]; W.
PROSSER, supra note 2, § 63; 2 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 357; Bohlen, Landlord and

Tenant, 35 HARv. L. REV. 633 (1922). Violations of the covenant to repair have been dealt
with in numerous cases. See, e.g., Williams v. Davis, 188 Kan. 385, 362 P.2d 641 (1961);
Sanford v. Belemyessi, 284 N.E.2d 588 (Mass. 1972); Reitmeyer v. Sprecher, 431 Pa. 284,
243 A.2d 395 (1968); Rampone v. Wanskuck Buildings, Inc., 102 R.I. 30, 227 A.2d 586
(1967).
8 2 R. POWELL, supra note 4, V 234[2].
9 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMEs, supra note 4, § 27.16; 2 R. POWELL, supra note 4, 234[2]; W.
PROSSER, supra note 2, § 63; 2 RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 362; 1 H. TIFFANY, supra note 2,
§ 105. Examples of cases involving the negligent repair exception are: Janofsky v. Garland,
42 Cal. 2d 655, 109 P.2d 750 (1941); Oglesby v. Rutledge,-67 Ga. App. 656, 21 S.E.2d 497
(1942); Rowan v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 79 N.H. 409, 109 A. 561 (1920); Marks v. Nambil
Realty Co., 245 N.Y. 256, 157 N.E. 129 (1927).
'0 W. PROSSER, supra note 2, § 63. See, e.g., Kelly v. Laclede Real Estate & Inv. Co., 348
Mo. 407, 155 S.W.2d 90 (1941) (lessor liable to passerby injured by falling piece of building
wall if injury resulted from permanent condition of building existing at time building was
leased).
1 This exception is often recognized where the leased premises are furnished. Cases in
this category sometimes contain language vaguely suggesting that recovery may be based on
an implied warranty of habitability.
Presson v. Mountain States Properties, Inc., 18 Ariz. App. 176, 501 P.2d 17 (1972),
involved injury to a tenant catised by a defective hot water heater. The court spoke in terms
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duced by recognition of these exceptions to the general rule of

immunity, it still remained a prerequisite for the injured party to fit
his case within one of these exceptions in order for the court even
12
to consider the negligence of the landlord.

In Sargent v. Ross,13 the Supreme Court of New Hampshire,

faced with "[tlhe anomaly of the general rule of landlord tort
immunity and the inflexibility of the standard exceptions,"1 4 elimi-

nated the requirement that the injured party fit his case within one
of the traditionally recognized exceptions to landlord immunity:
[W]e today discard the rule of "caveat lessee" and the doctrine of
landlord nonliability in tort to which it gave birth ....

Hence-

forth, landlords as other persons must exercise reasonable care
not to subject others to an unreasonable risk of harm."
I
BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE OF Sargent
Four-year-old Anna Sargent fell to her death from an outdoor
stairway of a residential building owned by the defendant-landlady,
of the implied warranty of habitability as being suggestive of judicial trends in landlordtenant law. It held that, in the case of a short-term residential lease, the landlord owes the
tenant a duty of care to maintain the premises free from unreasonably dangerous conditions, that the landlord has a duty to repair such conditions, and that failure to repair is
indicative of negligence. However, since the tenant first discovered the dangerous condition
three days after taking possession of the premises, the case could have fit within the
exception for situations in which a concealed defect was in existence at the beginning of the

term. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
California recognizes in the short-term lease of furnished premises an implied warranty
that the furniture is fit for use, violation of which can make the landlord liable to the tenant in
tort. Charleville v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 136 Cal. App. 349, 29 P.2d 241 (1934).
In Horton v. Marston, 352 Mass. 322, 225 N.E.2d 311 (1967), the tenant was injured by
the explosion of a gas stove a short time before her nine-month lease expired. The court
held that a nine-month lease was not of such length as to place the risk of concealed defects
on the tenant. The landlord impliedly covenanted that the cottage and its furnishings were
suitable for their intended use. Horton was based on an earlier tort case, involving an
extremely short lease, where recovery was said to be based on an implied warranty of
habitability. Hacker v. Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942). There is some
confusion in these two opinions as to whether the recovery is based on implied warranty or
on the failure to reveal concealed defects. The practical result in Massachusetts seems to be
that where a tenant is injured by a defect in the premises during a short-term lease a
presumption arises that the defect existed and was concealed by the landlord at the
beginning of the term.
For further discussion of the implied warranty of habitability as it relates to tenant
tort recovery, see note 43 infra.
12

"Unless a case fits into some one of the . . . categories .

. .

. the'lessor has no

responsibility to compensate the lessee for losses caused to the lessee by the condition of the
leased premises." 2 R. POWELL, supra note 4, 1 234[21[f].
13 308 A.2d 528 (N.H. 1973).
14

Id. at 532.

"3

Id. at 534.
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who resided on the first floor of the building. The stairway led to a
second-floor apartment, which was leased to the landlady's son and
her daughter-in-law, a regular babysitter for the child. Anna's
mother, as administratrix of the deceased child's estate, brought
suit against the daughter-in-law on a theory of negligent supervision of the child, and against the landlady for negligent construction and maintenance of the stairway. 16 At trial, the jury found that
the daughter-in-law had not been negligent, but returned a verdict
against the defendant-landlady. The evidence indicated two possible causes of the fall. First, the stairway, which had been added to
the building approximately eight years before the accident, was
dangerously steep, and second, the railing was insufficient to
prevent the child from falling over the side.' 7 On the

defendant-landlady's seasonable exceptions, all questions of law
were reserved and transferred to the Supreme Court.' 8

Chief Justice Kenison, speaking for the court, observed that at
trial the plaintiff had attempted to place the facts of her case within
one of the two possibly applicable exceptions to the general rule of
landlord immunity recognized in New Hampshire: 19 (1) the control
or common use exception; 20 and (2) the negligent repair
exception." The court recognized that it could uphold the verdict
below by straining the control or common use exception to include
a stairway used only by the defendant's tenant to reach the
second-floor apartment 22 or by broadening the negligent repair
16
17

Id. at 529-30.
Id. at 530.

18 Id.

at 529-30.

9 Id. at 530. It is unclear from the opinion whether the plaintiff relied upon just one,
or both, of the two possible theories.
20 See, e.g., Black v. Fiandaca, 98 N.H. 33, 92 A.2d 663 (1953); Flanders v. New
Hampshire Say. Bank, 90 N.H. 285, 7 A.2d 233 (1939). See also note 6 supra.
21 See, e.g., Rowan v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 79 N.H. 409, 109 A. 561 (1920). See also note
9 supra.
22 308 A.2d at 532. See also note 6 supra. In analogous situations, when a court is faced
with a plaintiff who it feels should recover but who does not fit within one of the exceptions,
adherence to the old landlord immunity rule requires strained interpretations and can
produce almost ludicrous results. For example, Coleman v. Steinberg, 54 N.J. 58, 253 A.2d
167 (1969), involved a duplex served by a single furnace in the cellar. One of the tenant's
radiators was fed by a bare "up-pipe" coming through the floor. The year-old son of the
tenant was severely burned when he came into contact with the pipe, which was not insulated
and which had no protective device to prevent contact with it. On appeal the court
remanded for a new trial on the issue of the landlord's negligence, holding that the plaintiff
had sustained the burden of fitting his case within the control or common use exception.
The court held that the "up-pipe" within the plaintiff's apartment was part of the duplex's
heating system as a whole. Since the heating system was for the benefit and common use of
all the tenants, possession and control remained in the landlord, who had a duty to maintain
common facilities in a reasonably safe condition.

1974]

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

1165

exception to include negligent construction of an improvement
which had taken place eight years before the accident.2 3 Instead,
however, the court, on its own motion, chose to do away with the
basic premise of landlord nonliability 24 and concentrated on the
question of whether or not the landlord had been negligent.
The court expressed four reasons for turning away from the
firmly established precedents found in New Hampshire case law.
First, it pointed to the difficulty of fitting the facts of the case at bar
into one of the traditional exceptions to landlord immunity, and
the tendency of the rigid inclusion requirements to becloud the
basic issue of responsibility for the injury suffered.25 In Sargent
the jury had found the defendant-landlady guilty of negligence in
the original construction .of the stairway or in permitting the
stairway to remain in a dangerous condition.26 As a proximate
result of this negligence a four-year-old child fell to her death. Yet
strict adherence to the control exception would have resulted in
denial of recovery to the plaintiff. According to traditional analysis,
the tenant could have argued convincingly that he was powerless to
remedy the dangerous condition because he neither owned the
house nor had any authority to repair defects; the landlady could
have argued successfully that the stairway, leading only to the
single second-floor apartment, was not within her control.27 The
trial in such cases bogs down in conflicting evidence as to which
party had control of the area where the injury occurred, whether
the landlord had knowledge of a latent defect at the time of the
leasing, whether oral assurances constituted a covenant to repair,
and other similar issues. Ignored is what should be the central
question: upon whom is it most reasonable to place the risk of
28
injury in a given case?
Second, the court argued that the traditional control or common use rule "actually disdourages a landlord from remedying a
dangerous condition since his repairs may be evidence of his
control. ' 29 A landlord, already disinclined to make repairs because
of the expense involved, would be reinforced in his reluctance by
23 308 A.2d at 533. See also note 9 supra.
24 The court declared that "now is the time for the landlord's limited tort immunity to
be relegated to the history books where it more properly belongs." 308 A.2d at 533.
25 Id. at 532-33.
26 It cannot be determined from the opinion upon which of the possible alternative
grounds for finding negligence the jury based its decision. Id. at 530.
27 Id. at 532.
28 Id. "The emphasis on control and other exceptions to the rule of nonliability, both at
trial and on appeal, unduly complicated the jury's task and diverted effort and attention
from the central issue of the unreasonableness of the risk." Id. at 533.
29 Id. at 532.
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the prospect of increased exposure to tort liability. Such discour-

agement of repair contravenes the logical position that the landlord, who retains possession of the building after departure of the
tenant and is therefore best able to make repairs, should bear the
burden of assuring safe living conditions in rental housing. The

Sargent court, in abandoning landlord immunity, adopted the view
that it is more practicable to expect the landlord to remedy
dangerous conditions, particularly where a substantial alteration is
required.3 0 Elimination of immunity and imposition of "the ordinary negligence standard should help insure that a landlord Will
take whatever precautions are reasonably necessary under the
circumstances to reduce the likelihood of injuries from defects in
3

his property." '
Third, the court found that the retention of landlord tort
immunity would be incompatible with the judicial trend toward
abrogation of the traditional immunities of certain groups from
tort liability.3 2 Earlier New Hampshire decisions had eliminated the
tort immunities of spouses,3 3 the sovereign, 3 4 parents, 35 charitable
organizations, 3 6 and real estate vendors. 37 Stressing the trend toward modernization of tort law, the court alluded to numerous
recent cases questioning the traditional invitee-licensee-trespasser
distinction, with their emphasis on the conduct of the parties rather
than on the status of the injured party. 8 In view of the modern
trend to eliminate the tort immunity of certain classes and to avoid
artificial classifications and distinctions, the Sargent court saw no
reason for continuing the privileged position of the landlord.
Id.
3' Id. at 535. See 62 HARV. L. REv. 669 (1949). The author advocates imposing on the
30

landlord the duty to repair because
the lessor would fall within the general proposition underlying many areas of tort
law that he who owns or is in a position to control or is responsible for things or
persons has' the duty to prevent their harming others. And the large body of
negligence principles which have developed in other fields would bound this duty.
Id. at 678.
32 308 A.2d at 533.

a Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 657 (1915).
34 Hurley v. Town of Hudson, 112 N.H. 365, 296 A.2d 905 (1972).
" Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314,
211 A.2d 410 (1965).
31 Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hosp., 90 N.H. 337, 9 A.2d 761 (1939).
37 Derby v. Public Serv. Co., 100 N.H. 53, 119 A.2d 335 (1955).
11 308 A.2d at 534-35. See, e.g., Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968); Mile
High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971); Pickard v. City & County of
Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43 (Mass.
1973); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1971). See also 121 U. PA. L.
REv. 387 (1972); 25 VAND. L. REv. 623 (1972).
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Fourth, the court found no remaining social justification for
landlord immunity, which-had developed during the period when,
as a practical matter, the lessee exercised virtually complete control
over the landA9 Viewing the immunity doctrine as inextricably tied
to the values of a predominantly agrarian past, the court saw the
abrogation of landlord immunity as a logical extension of related
recent developments in landlord-tenant law. 40 In 1971, the court,
in Kline v. Burns,4 I had recognized an implied warranty of habitability in the lease of rental housing for the following reasons: (1) the
legislature, in establishing housing codes, has recognized the need
for a dwelling to be habitable at the beginning, and throughout the
term, of the lease; (2) the landlord is more likely to have better
knowledge of the condition of the premises than the tenant, in part
because housing code violations are usually reported to the landlord; (3) the landlord retains ownership of the premises and should
bear the cost of repairs necessary to make them habitable; and (4)
the landlord is in a better bargaining position than the tenant. The
Sargent court recognized that the same factors supporting an implied warranty of habitability also favored the elimination of landlord immunity and thus supported the exposure of the landlord to
liability for negligence without forcing the plaintiff to fit his case
within one of the exceptions. 4 2 The implied warranty of habitability
supplied the tenant's need for habitable living conditions, but
provided no protection from tort injuries caused by defects in or
on the premises. 43 The court saw no reason for not broadening the
39 2

RESTATEMENT,

supra note I, § 356, comment a.

40 308 A.2d at 533-34.
41 -111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971). For further discussion of implied warranty of
habitability as related to tortious injury to tenants, see note 43 infra.
42 308 A.2d at 533-34. The archaic attitude underlying landlord immunity is well
expressed in Miller v. Hooper, 119 Me. 527, 529, 112 A. 256, 257 (1921):
* An owner may build a tenement house with stairways which because of steepness or
for other obvious structural reasons are inconvenient or even unsafe. The tenant
cannot exact any change. If such stairways need to be repaired or rebuilt, the owner
is not required to make them safer or more convenient.
43 The traditional rule that there is no implied warranty in the lease of rental housing is
expressd in Clarke v. Sharpe, 76 N.H. 446, 83 A. 1090 (1912), and Towne v. Thompson, 68
N.H. 317, 44 A. 492 (1895). Warranties were first recognized in short-term leases of
furnished premises. E.g., Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969) (implied
warranty of habitability and fitness in lease of furnished house for two periods of three and
six months; breach of warranty because rats present in dwelling); Horton v. Marston, 352
Mass. 322, 225 N.E.2d 311 (1967). The landmark implied warranty case, Pines v. Perssion,
14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), involved a nine-month lease of a furnished house
and could have been fit within the exception for short-term leases of furnished premises. See
note 11 supra.
The number of jurisdictions with judicially created implied warranties in long-term
leases is rapidly increasing. E.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.),
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protection of the tenant, stating that the elimination of landlord
cert. denied, 400 U.S 925 (1970); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661
(1972); Lund v. MacArthur, 51 Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little,
50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Marini v.
Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251
A.2d 268 (1969); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973). These cases follow
reasoning similar to that found in Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971). See
note 41 and accompanying text supra.
See also Quinn & Phillips, supra note 2; Skillern, Implied Warranties in Leases: The Needfor
Change, 44 DENVER L. REV. 387 (1967); Note, Landlord v. Tenant: An Appraisal of the
Habitability and Repair Problem, 22 CAS. W. REs. L. REV. 739 (1971); Comment, Implied
Warranty of Habitabilityin Lease of FurnishedPremisesfor Short Term: Erosion of CaveatEmptor, 3
U. RICH. L. REv. 322 (1969); Comment, Tenant Remedies-The Implied Warranty of Fitness and
Habitability, 16 VILL. L. REv. 710 (1971); 56 CORNELL L. REV. 489 (1971); 21 DRAKE L. REV.
300 (1972); 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 123 (1971).
Two model acts also embody an implied warranty of habitability: ABA MODEL
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT
CODE §§ 2-203 to -206 (Tent. Draft 1969); NAT'L
CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAwS, UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND

TENANT ACT § 2.104 (Final Draft 1972).
The common denominator of the above-cited cases, articles, notes, and model acts is
their failure to discuss the problem of a landlord's tort liability. They emphasize the need to
provide remedies for substandard housing (see, e.g., Quinn & Phillips, supra note 2); tort
recovery by the tenant is almost wholly ignored. The implied warranty of habitability does
not provide a basis for a tort action in the same way that implied warranties do in sales
situations. E.g., Crotty v. Shartenberg's-New Haven, Inc., 147 Conn. 460, 162 A.2d 513
(1960). This fact is implicit in the Sargent court's position that its rationale is a logical extension
of Kline (see note 41 and accompanying text supra), and in the infrequent discussion of
tortious injuries to tenants in other implied warranty cases.
One student note does discuss the possible effects of implied warranty on the tort
liability of landlords. 56 CORNELL L. REV. 489 (1971). The author suggests that many courts
base the finding of an implied warranty of habitability in the legislative mandate provided by
housing codes. Since the housing codes are found to impose a duty on landlords, the
violation of a housing code regulation should be evidence of negligence per se, subjecting
the landlord to liability in tort. The author also suggests that the concept of negligence may
not even be pertinent-if a housing code violation is seen as a defect in a product, then strict
liability may result. Id. at 499.
Only if some jurisdiction having an implied warranty of habitability should hold that
violation of the implied warranty produces strict liability would an injured tenant want to
bring his claim under an implied warranty theory, while perhaps alleging negligence as an
alternative basis for recovery. In a jurisdiction which has recognized an implied warranty,
but is not willing to use it to impose on landlords strict liability in tort, a tenant unable to
place his claim within one of the exceptions to landlord immunity might want to base his
action on an implied warranty theory. A court permitting such a claim would in effect be
recognizing yet another exception to landlord immunity, involving the same problems
accompanying the exceptions swept away by Sargent.
There are several logical reasons why, absent strict liability for violation of implied
warranty, it would be wiser to follow a Sargent negligence approach than to carve out yet
another exception to landlord immunity-this time based on implied warranty. Courts in
various jurisdictions have produced widely varying definitions of what constitutes a breach of
the implied warranty. In Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395, 261 A.2d 413
(1970), it was held that to be actionable a breach of the implied warranty must be so
substantial as to amount to a constructive eviction. In Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d
351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972), the court stated that the implied warranty of habitability is
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nonliability follows "naturally and inexorably" 44 from the decision
to recognize an implied warranty of habitability in rental housing.
Thus, in the court's view, the responsibility of the landlord extends
beyond providing habitable living conditions: he is required to
maintain the premises in the manner in which they would be
maintained by a reasonable man wanting to prevent injury to his
tenants and their visitors.
Applying the standard of "reasonable care, ' 4" 5 the court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found
that the defendant had negligently designed or constructed the
stairway or that she had negligently failed to remedy the dangerous
condition or warn the child of the danger.4 6 Since contributory
negligence was not an issue because of the age of the deceased,4 7
the court sustained the verdict of the jury and entered judgment
thereon.
II
THE FUTURE OF THE

Sargent

DOCTRINE

As the New Hampshire court pointed out, the abandonment
of landlord immunity is a logical step to be taken in conjunction
with the finding of an implied warranty of habitability in the lease
of rental housing. 48 It is likely, therefore, that a negligence apfulfilled by substantial compliance with the housing code. It is not difficult to imagine fact
situations under which sudi definitions of the implied warranty would be of little use to the
tenant attempting to recover for tortious injury.
If the implied warranty of habitability is defined by the provisions of the housing code,
as it is in a number of jurisdictions (e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970)), a tenant injured by a defect in the premises
could conceivably be denied recovery if the dangerous condition causing the injury happened to be one not covered by the housing code. Such an approach would produce many of
the same problems tenants encounter in attempting to fit their cases within the traditional
exceptions to landlord immunity. That is, a concern for ritualistic categorization would
predominate, rather than the issue of whether in a given case the landlord should bear
responsibility for a particular injury.
Finally, the basing of tenant recovery on negligence law rather than on implied warranty
permits the courts to draw upon the large, established body of negligence principles in
determining liability. 62 HARv. L. Rav. 669, 678 (1949).
44 308 A.2d at 533.

4' See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
46 308 A.2d at 531.

47 Id. at 552. The court relied on Dorais v. Paquin, 304 A.2d 369 (N.H. 1973), which
held that the normal standard of care required of children for their own protection is that
which is reasonable to expect of children of like age, intelligence, and experience under
similar circumstances.
48 308 A.2d at 533.
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proach similar to that of Sargent will eventually be adopted in other
jurisdictions.4 9 However., the impact of a simple negligence approach in landlord-tenant litigation remains to be gauged.
Under a negligence approach the tenant must still allege and
prove that the landlord failed to exercise reasonable care under all
the circumstances. 50 And precise formulation of the landlord's
"' In a case decided after Sargent, a California court of appeals employed a Sargent-like
analysis. In discussing the weight to be given the landlord's control over the premises in
determining his tort liability, the court in Brennan v. Cockrel Inv., Iric., 35 Cal. App.
3d 796, 111 Cal. Rptr. 122 (1973), stated:
Possession and degree of control over -the premises are significant factors to be
weighed in determining whether or not the landlord failed to meet the statutory
standard of care. Indeed, these considerations go to the very essence of the
negligence issue. But . . . [t]hat a landlord must act toward his tenant as a
reasonable person under all of the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury,
the probable seriousness of such injury, the burden of reducing or avoiding the
risk, and his degree of control over the risk-creating defect, seems a sound
proposition and one that expresses well the principles of justice and reasonableness
upon which the law of torts is based. It is no part of fairness and rationality to
transform possession and control from mere factors bearing on negligence into
barriers to consideration of that issue.
Id. at 800-01, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 125. The court mentioned Sargent as indicative of the trend in
other jurisdictions toward applying ordinary rules of negligence to tort cases involving
owners and occupiers of land. Id. at 801, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 126. It based its holding, however,
on an extension of the rationale of Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), which rejected the traditional licensee-invitee distinction and applied
ordinary negligence principles to a case involving injury to a social guest.
50 The tenant may be aided in proving negligence by the existence of a housing code in
his jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions treat housing code violations by a landlord as negligence
per se. See, e.g., Morningstar v. Strick, 326 Mich. 541, 40 N.W.2d 719 (1950) (plaintiff infant
severely burned by steam emitting from radiator; violation of state housing law, requiring
that heating and plumbing equipment in every dwelling be kept in good repair by the owner,
held negligence per se); McLain v. Haley, 53 N.M. 327, 207 P.2d 1013 (1949) (tenant injured
in fall from outside stairway having no railing, in violation of housing code; failure to
comply with housing code held negligence per se); Altz v. Leiberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 134 N.E.
703 (1922) (tenant injured by falling ceiling; statute imposing duty on landlord to keep
tenement house in good repair included duty to repair individual apartments); Annot., 17
A.L.R.2d 704 (1951).
Some jurisdictions, however, treat housing code violations as merely "some evidence" of
negligence. See, e.g., Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(tenant injured when bedroom ceiling fell on her; violation of housing regulations "some
evidence" of negligence); Ellis v. Caprice, 96 N.J. Super. 539, 233 A.2d 654, certification
denied, 50 N.J. 409, 235 A.2d 901 (1967) (six tenants died in tenement fire; dictum that
statute requiring fireproofing of airshafts for protection of tenants may be considered some
evidence of negligence if breach caused injury).
Other jurisdictions treat housing code violations as irrelevant to the question of negligence. See, e.g., Chambers v. Lowe, 117 Conn. 624, 169 A. 912 (1933) (tenant injured by
plaster falling from bedroom ceiling; statute imposing on landlord duty to keep building in
good repair did not include duty to repair individual apartments within building); Stapleton
v. Cohen, 353 Mass. 53, 228 N.E.2d 64 (1967) (violation of municipal building code
requiring lighting of common hallways not considered evidence of negligence); Newman v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 77 N.D. 466, 43 N.W.2d 411 (1950) (tenant injured by collapsing bed;
landlord not liable for personal injury to tenant although statute required landlord to keep
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duty may not be possible. The Sargent court, however, outlined a
framework for the division of responsibility for keeping rented
premises safe. The court noted that it would be unfair to hold a
landlord liable for an accident caused by the tenant's faulty care of
the premises, 5 1 but it also noted that "ordinarily the landlord is best
able to remedy dangerous conditions, particularly where a substantial alteration is required. ' 52 It is the lessor's ownership and control
which impose upon him the duty to prevent harm to others.5 3 In
order to discharge the burden "[a] landlord must act as a reasonable person under all of the circumstances including the likelihood
of injury to others, the probable seriousness of such injuries, and
the burden of reducing or avoiding the risk. 54
Although under Sargent the plaintiff retains the burden of
proving negligence, he is relieved of the often more difficult
burden of squeezing his case .ithin one of the narrow exceptions
to landlord immunity. The outcome in a Sargent-type case will no
longer hinge on such hairsplitting concerns and peripheral issues
as whether the area where the injury occurred was under the
control of the landlord or was provided for the common use of all
tenants. 55 The New Hampshire court emphasized that
[t]he questions of control, hidden defects and common or public
use, which formerly had to be established as a prerequisite to
premises fit for occupation and to make repairs on notice, because statutory remedies
allowing tenant to make repairs at landlord's expense considered exclusive); Alfe v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 180 Okla. 87, 67 P.?d 947 (1937) (tenant injured when defective gas
heating system exploded; violation of housing code no evidence of negligence; housing code
remedies permitting tenant either to vacate or to make repairs at landlord's expense
considered exclusive).
51 308 A.2d at 531.
52 Id. at 532.
53 Id. at 534.
54 Id.
n5 In Black v. Fiandaca, 98 N.H. 33, 93 A.2d 663 (1953), the plaintiff was a guest in a
second-floor apartment. The plaintiff went to the attic above the apartment and was injured
when he fell through the floor, which consisted of boards laid across the joists, with open
spaces between them. After a trial without jury, the court found that the defendant landlord
was not negligent. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reversed, holding that the
decisive question was whether the defendant was in control of the attic. If the tenants used
the attic pursuant to oral permission from the landlord, the defendant had a duty to remedy
or give warning of hidden defects. If the tenants used the attic as an appurtenance to the
leased apartment for common use, the defendant had a duty to discover defects and make
them safe. If the tenants exclusively controlled the attic, then the landlord's sole duty was not
to deceive the tenants as to dangers of which the defendant knew and the tenants did not. A
new trial was granted because the trial court had made no finding on the crucial issue of
control, which governed the standard for the defendant's conduct; whether the defendant
was negligent would depend upon the standard applied. Accord, Flanders v. New Hampshire
Say. Bank, 90 N.H. 285, 7 A.2d 233 (1939).
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even considering the negligence of a landlord] will now be
relevant only inasmuch as they bear on the basic tort issues such
as the foreseeability and unreasonableness of the particular risk
56
of harm.

The Sargent negligence approach should thus have its greatest
impact in cases where formerly the plaintiff, despite a meritorious
claim, was unable to fit his case within one of the exceptions to
landlord immunity. Sargent undoubtedly will enable more plaintiffs
to go to the jury on the issue of negligence, particularly in cases
which, under the old law, would demand proof of control or
concealed defect. 5 7 In this area, Sargent will help to prevent unjust
results. For example, in the Massachusetts case of Sanford v.
Belemyessij 8 the plaintiff was denied recovery because of failure to
prove that a porch was under the landlord's control, although the
court assumed that the evidence was such as to make the landlord
liable for negligence had control by the landlord been established.
Through inflexible application of the control test, a landlord who
had been found negligent was granted immunity from tort
liability-even though he had previously known of the defect
causing the injury and had agreed to repair it.5 9
An important question raised, but not answered, by Sargent is
whether its salutary effects can be defeated by landlords using the
defenses of contributory negligence or assumption of risk. The
New Hampshire court was able to avoid this question because of
the age of the injured party. 60 Furthermore, the doctrine of assumption of risk has been found not to apply in New Hampshire
landlord-tenant cases. 61 However, if the injured party in Sargent
56 308 A.2d at 534.
5' See notes 4 & 6 supra.
58 284 N.E.2d 588 (Mass. 1972). The plaintiff was injured in a fall on the rear porch of
a duplex. It was held that control by the landlord was not established by the evidence,
because the porch provided access only to the plaintiff's apartment. The fact that the defect
in the porch had been brought to the attention of the landlord, who had agreed to repair it,
did not furnish a basis for liability in tort, because of the traditional distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance. Despite the jury's having found for the plaintiff, the court
overruled the plaintiff's exceptions to the trial judge's setting aside of the jury verdicts.
59 A similar result was reached on similar facts by an Ohio appellate court in Bowman v.
Goldsmith Bros., 63 Ohio L. Abs. 428, 109 N.E.2d 556, appeal dismissed, 158 Ohio St. 121,
107 N.E.2d 114 (1952) (stairway providing access to tenant's apartment only). See Masterson
v. Atherton, 149 Conn. 302, 179 A.2d 592 (1962); Kowinko v. Salecky, 5 Conn. Cir. 657, 260
A.2d 892 (1969); Anderson v. Hamilton Gardens, Inc., 4 Conn. Cir. 255, 229 A.2d 705,
certification denied, 154 Conn. 719, 222 A.2d 809 (1966); Hannon v. Schwartz, 304 Mass. 468,
23 N.E.2d 1022 (1939); Cobb v. Rutland Say. Bank, 113 Vt. 117, 29 A.2d 705 (1943).
6) See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
61 Ayers v. Gordon, 94 N.H. 30, 45 A.2d 656 (1946); Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265,
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had been an adult, the landlord could have argued that the defect
in the stairway was obvious, and that by using the stairway with
knowledge of the danger the plaintiff was contributorily negligent
or had assumed the risk as a matter of law. At least one court
has accepted such an argument. In Roberts v. Burkette,6 2 an
eighty-five-year-old woman who slipped and fell on the stairs in a
building where she had been a tenant for two or three years was
found by a Florida court to be contributorily negligent as a matter
of law.
Most courts, however, tend to distinguish situations in which
the tenant has an obvious alternative to using the dangerous
portion of the premises from situations in which no such alternative exists. Where no alternative exists the courts will not find
contributory negligence or assumption of risk as a matter of law. In
Manes v. Hines & McNair Hotels, Inc., 63 the plaintiff was injured
when she slipped on a six inch by eighteen inch wet spot in a nine
foot wide hallway. The Supreme Court of Tennessee found that
because she was well aware of the wet spot and could easily have
avoided it, she was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
Other courts have reached similar results where the defective
portion of the premises was one which the tenant could easily have
avoided or was not one which the tenant absolutely needed to
use.

64

The majority of courts, however, hold that where the injury
occurs in some portion of the leased premises which the tenant
18 A.2d 377 (1941). The rationale behind these cases is that a tenant should not be found to
have assumed the risk by using some portion of the premises the use of which cannot be
avoided. See notes 65-70 and accompanying text infra.
62 245 So. 2d 134 (Fla. App.), cert. denied,'248 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1971). The outcome may
have resulted from an erroneous extension' of the principle expressed in Joskowitz v.
Holtman, 134 So. 2d 265 (Fla. App. 1961) (see note 64 infra). That case announced the
principle that if the tenant has a reasonable alternative to using a dangerous portion of the
premises, he must use the alternative or be held contributorly negligent as a matter of law.
63 184 Tenn. 210, 197 S.W.2d 889 (1946).
64 See, e.g., Joskowitz v. Holtman, 134 So. 2d 265 (Fla. App. 1961) (tenant tripped over
overlapping carpet runner in hall; condition in existence over a year); Hicks v. Board of
Supervisors of La. State U. & A. & M. College, 189 So. 2d 90 (La. App.), writ refused, 249 La.
730, 190 So. 2d 239 (1966) (no liability to plaintiff partially crippled by polio who fell in
drainage ditch between student housing units at state university in circumstances where
safer, well-lighted route available); Good v. Jones, 184 Neb. 454, 168 N.W.2d 520 (1969) (no
recovery against landlord for injury resulting from fall over concrete slab in front of
apartment building where defect minor and readily apparent, accident occurred during
daylight, and plaintiff aware of defect); Harris v. Nachamson Dep't Stores Co., 247 N.C.
195, 100 S.E.2d 323 (1957) (recovery for fall down muddy, slippery stairway denied where
plaintiff knew of alternate stairway which was dry); Lisk v. Dickey, I Wash. App. 112, 459
P.2d 810 (1969) (recovery denied where plaintiff knew of alternative to using icy sidewalk).
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cannot avoid using, the issue of contributory negligence is for the
fact-finder. 65 For example, in Kanelos v. Kettler, 66 the plaintiff was
injured when her slipper caught in a deteriorated bathroom door
sill, causing her to fall. The trial judge directed a verdict for the
defendant-landlord on the ground that the plaintiff had assumed
the risk. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed, and
ordered a new trial on the issues of the plaintiff's contributory
negligence and the negligence of the landlord. The same result was
reached in McKenzie v. Egge, 67 where the plaintiff had notified the
landlord of a defect in the back porch of a second-floor apartment
and was subsequently injured when the porch collapsed. The trial
court directed a verdict for the landlord. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland reversed, holding that it was unreasonable to expect the
plaintiff to forego all use of the porch, which was a necessary
adjunct to use of the apartment, and that the question of contributory negligence therefore should have been submitted to the
jury. These cases suggest that where there is no reasonable alternative to avoiding the danger the tenant runs little risk of being
found contributorily negligent as a matter of law and he will almost
certainly be permitted to reach the jury.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts also provides support for the

proposition that a tenant is not contributorily negligent as a matter
of law if he is exercising a right or privilege in connection with his
lease of living quarters. The Restatement would permit the landlord
the defense of contributory negligence under such circumstances
68
only if the tenant acts unreasonably.
65 Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (deteriorated bathroom door sill);
Finch v. Willmott, 107 Cal. App. 662, 290 P. 660 (1930) (dilapidated stairs providing only
access to second-floor apartment); Conroy v. Briley, 191 So. 2d 601 (Fla. App. 1966), cert.
denied, 201 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1967) (stairway lacking handrail providing only access to
second-floor apartment); Murray v. Patton, 118 So. 2d 704 (La. App. 1960) (stairway
providing sole access to apartment); Sachs v. Pleasant, 253 Md. 40, 251 A.2d 858 (1969)
(broken toilet seat); McKenzie v. Egge, 207 Md. 1, 113 A.2d 95 (1955) (collapsing porch);
Braimaster v. Wolf, 320 Mass. 620, 70 N.E.2d 697 (1947) (stairway providing only access to
boiler heating tenant's room); Schwab v. Allou Corp., 177 Neb. 342, 128 N.W.2d 835 (1964)
(ice accumulation on sole entranceway to building); Rush v. Commercial Realty Co., 7 N.J.
Misc. 337, 145 A. 476 (1929) (defective privy); Conway v. Sciano, 27 Misc. 2d 970, 211
N.Y.S.2d 275 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (defective step between dining room and kitchen); Beck v.
Dutra, 129 Vt. 615, 285 A.2d 732 (1971) (defective stairway providing sole access to tenant's
apartment); Jorgensen v. Massart, 61 Wash. 2d 491, 378 P.2d 941 (1963) (flooded kitchen
floor); Hape v. Rath, 492 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 1972) (ice accumulation on sole entranceway to
building).
66 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
67 207 Md. 1, 113 A.2d 95 (1955).
68 § 473. Danger Encountered in Exercise of Right or Privilege.
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Whether the defense of assumption of risk should be available
to a landlord in a tort suit by a tenant is highly questionable. 69 The
tenant cannot be said to have voluntarily assumed the risk when he
uses some part of the premises which is absolutely necessary or
unavoidable, yet possibly dangerous because of the landlord's
negligence. For that reason, courts in several jurisdictions have
concluded that the defense of assumption of risk is inapplicable in
70
landlord-tenant cases.
It is apparent that in most jurisdictions the more favorable
conditions for tort suits against landlords provided by adoption of
the Sargent rule would not be defeated by the defenses of contributory negligence or assumption of risk. The tenant would be
found to be contributorily negligent or to have assumed the risk as
a matter of law only if there existed an obvious alternative to use of
the portion of the premises causing the injury. It would not be
contributory negligence or assumption of-the risk as a matter of
law if the tenant were injured while using a portion of the premises
necessary to his enjoyment of them.
CONCLUSION

Sargent is a significant and logically sound advance in the law
of landlord and tenant. It represents an important step in the
current movement "to revise and modernize the law of landlord
and tenant to serve more realistically the needs of an urban
society.' 1 The abandonment of landlord immunity embodied in
Sargent is a useful complement to the rapidly expanding law of
If the defendant's negligence has made the plaintiff's exercise of a right or privilege
impossible unless he exposes himself to a risk of bodily harm, the plaintiff is not
guilty of contributory negligence in so doing unless he acts unreasonably.
2 REsTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 473.

69 In Massachusetts the defense of assumption of risk is a question for the jury.
Braimaster v. Wolf, 320 Mass. 620, 70 N.E.2d 697 (1947).
7' See, e.g., Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Ayers v. Gordon, 94 N.H.
30, 45 A.2d 656 (1946); Papakalos v. Shaka, 91 N.H. 265, 18 A.2d 377 (1941); Rush v.
Commercial Realty Co., 7 N.J. Misc. 337, 145 A. 476 (1929); Beck v. Dutra, 129 Vt. 615, 285
A.2d 732 (1971).
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals expressed its reasoning as follows:
Appellant's evidence was of a caliber sufficient to require submission for the jury's
determination of the issue whether [the landlord's] duty had been dishonored. If it
was, appellee cannot now avoid liability by the suggestion that appellant was at
liberty to avert the danger by moving out. She could not, in the face of appellee's
affirmative duty to exert care, be held to have voluntarily assumed the risk of injury
posed by his negligence.
Kanelos v. Kettler, 406 F.2d 951, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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implied warranties of habitability in rental housing.7 2 The combined force of these two legal advances will greatly improve the
position of the tenant and enable the law more appropriately to
respond to the conditions of modern urban society.
Frank H. Andorka
72

See note 43 supra.

